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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55006
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| Title: | | The organization of anticorruption: Getting incentives right!  |
| Authors: | | Graf Lambsdorff, Johann |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-57-08 |
| Abstract: | | Governments and private firms try to contain corruption among their staff mostly in a top-down, rules-based approach. They limit discretion, increase monitoring or impose harsher penalties. Principles-based, bottom-up approaches to anticorruption, instead, emphasize the importance of value systems and employee's intrinsic motivation. This embraces the invigorating of social control systems, encouraging whistle-blowing, coding of good practice and alerting to red flags. This paper investigates how some top-down measures run counter to bottom-up contributions. Examples range from penalties imposed with zero-tolerance, debarment or the nullity of contracts. While top-down elements are indispensable for containing corruption they must be designed well in order to avoid discouraging the bottom-up endeavors. |
| Subjects: | | Corruption whistle-blowing contract penalties debarment nullity |
| JEL: | | D73 K42 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau
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