EconStor >
Universität Passau >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Passau >
Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title:The organization of anticorruption: Getting incentives right! PDF Logo
Authors:Graf Lambsdorff, Johann
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-57-08
Abstract:Governments and private firms try to contain corruption among their staff mostly in a top-down, rules-based approach. They limit discretion, increase monitoring or impose harsher penalties. Principles-based, bottom-up approaches to anticorruption, instead, emphasize the importance of value systems and employee's intrinsic motivation. This embraces the invigorating of social control systems, encouraging whistle-blowing, coding of good practice and alerting to red flags. This paper investigates how some top-down measures run counter to bottom-up contributions. Examples range from penalties imposed with zero-tolerance, debarment or the nullity of contracts. While top-down elements are indispensable for containing corruption they must be designed well in order to avoid discouraging the bottom-up endeavors.
contract penalties
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
684336847.pdf212.26 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.