Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55001 
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dc.contributor.authorGraf Lambsdorff, Johannen
dc.contributor.authorFrank, Björnen
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-27-
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T15:36:23Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-03T15:36:23Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55001-
dc.description.abstractWe let students play a corruption game, embedded into a variant of the ultimatum game. Those allotted the role of public servants chose between whistleblowing, opportunism and reciprocity by delivery (of a contract) and those acting as businesspeople chose how to frame the game and whether to blow the whistle. While opportunism and abstaining from whistleblowing is the Nash equilibrium, another likely outcome was that businesspeople allocate resources to punishing public servants for non-delivery, exhibiting a preference for negative reciprocity. Anticipating this, public servants might tend to reciprocate or blow the whistle upfront. Female public servants were more inclined to behave opportunistically; female businesspeople were less engaged in negative reciprocity. This corroborates a favorable role of women in anticorruption. Businesspeople who strongly preferred a corrupt framing of the game and obtained a form with corrupt wording were more willing to punish non-delivering public servants. This operates against camouflaging a bribe as a gift, because gifts fail to signal negative reciprocity.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cPassauen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPassauer Diskussionspapiere - Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe |xV-51-07en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordultimatum gameen
dc.subject.keywordwhistleblowingen
dc.subject.keywordgenderen
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen
dc.subject.keywordtrusten
dc.titleCorrupt reciprocity: An experiment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn684327775en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:upadvr:V5107en

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