Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55001
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dc.contributor.authorGraf Lambsdorff, Johannen_US
dc.contributor.authorFrank, Björnen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T15:36:23Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-03T15:36:23Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55001-
dc.description.abstractWe let students play a corruption game, embedded into a variant of the ultimatum game. Those allotted the role of public servants chose between whistleblowing, opportunism and reciprocity by delivery (of a contract) and those acting as businesspeople chose how to frame the game and whether to blow the whistle. While opportunism and abstaining from whistleblowing is the Nash equilibrium, another likely outcome was that businesspeople allocate resources to punishing public servants for non-delivery, exhibiting a preference for negative reciprocity. Anticipating this, public servants might tend to reciprocate or blow the whistle upfront. Female public servants were more inclined to behave opportunistically; female businesspeople were less engaged in negative reciprocity. This corroborates a favorable role of women in anticorruption. Businesspeople who strongly preferred a corrupt framing of the game and obtained a form with corrupt wording were more willing to punish non-delivering public servants. This operates against camouflaging a bribe as a gift, because gifts fail to signal negative reciprocity.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. Passau, Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. |cPassauen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPassauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe |xV-51-07en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordultimatum gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordwhistleblowingen_US
dc.subject.keywordgenderen_US
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrusten_US
dc.titleCorrupt reciprocity: An experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn684327775en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:upadvr:V5107-

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