Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55000 
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dc.contributor.authorGraf Lambsdorff, Johannen
dc.contributor.authorNell, Mathiasen
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-26-
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T15:36:21Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-03T15:36:21Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55000-
dc.description.abstractCorrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism. Moreover, denunciation and extortion add another layer of uncertainty for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators can use an asymmetric design of criminal sanctions to amplify these inherent risks, thereby destabilizing corrupt arrangements. It is also shown that asymmetric penalties do not necessarily interfere with the goal of deterrence and that immunity may be a useful tool to disband the pact of silence characteristic of corrupt arrangements.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cPassauen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPassauer Diskussionspapiere - Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe |xV-41-05en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Sanctionsen
dc.subject.keywordDestabilizationen
dc.subject.keywordOpportunismen
dc.subject.keywordDenunciationen
dc.subject.keywordImmunityen
dc.titleLet them take gifts, and cheat those who seek influence-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn684264439en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:upadvr:V4105en

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