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dc.contributor.authorGraf Lambsdorff, Johannen_US
dc.contributor.authorNell, Mathiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T15:36:21Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-03T15:36:21Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55000-
dc.description.abstractCorrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism. Moreover, denunciation and extortion add another layer of uncertainty for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators can use an asymmetric design of criminal sanctions to amplify these inherent risks, thereby destabilizing corrupt arrangements. It is also shown that asymmetric penalties do not necessarily interfere with the goal of deterrence and that immunity may be a useful tool to disband the pact of silence characteristic of corrupt arrangements.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. Passau, Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. Passauen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPassauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-41-05en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Sanctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordDestabilizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordOpportunismen_US
dc.subject.keywordDenunciationen_US
dc.subject.keywordImmunityen_US
dc.titleLet them take gifts, and cheat those who seek influenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn684264439en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:upadvr:V4105-
Appears in Collections:Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, Universität Passau

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