Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54928 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3677
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Standard media economics models imply that increased platform competition decreases ad levels and that mergers reduce per-viewer ad prices. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. We attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and that viewers single-home. Allowing for crowding in viewer attention spans for ads may reverse standard results, as does allowing viewers to multi-home.
Subjects: 
media economics
pricing ads
advertising clutter
information congestion
mergers, entry
JEL: 
D11
D43
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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