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dc.contributor.authorBattaglini, Marcoen_US
dc.contributor.authorNunnari, Salvatoreen_US
dc.contributor.authorPalfrey, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-23T10:59:27Z-
dc.date.available2012-01-23T10:59:27Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/54759-
dc.description.abstractWe present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment which can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of investment and consumption. In each period, a legislature with presentatives of each of n districts bargain over the current period's endowment for investment in the public good and transfers to each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes required for passage. We show that the efficiency of the public policy is increasing in q because higher q leads to higher investment in the public good and less pork. We examine the theoretical equilibrium predictions by conducting a laboratory experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and dictatorship (q=1).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWZB Discussion Paper SP II 2011-205en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelH54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic political economyen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen_US
dc.titleLegislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investmenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn683228730en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:SPII2011205-
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des WZB
Discussion Papers, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, WZB

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