Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54590
Authors: 
Konrad, Kai A.
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2011-105
Abstract: 
This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of budget constraints, the role of information transfer inside the alliance, and the role of in-group favoritism.
Subjects: 
Alliances
contests
conflict
in-group favoritism
JEL: 
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
664.84 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.