EconStor >
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) >
Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54590
  
Title:Strategic aspects of fighting in alliances PDF Logo
Authors:Konrad, Kai A.
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Discussion papers // Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik: Forschungsprofessur & Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism SP II 2011-105
Abstract:This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of budget constraints, the role of information transfer inside the alliance, and the role of in-group favoritism.
Subjects:Alliances
contests
conflict
in-group favoritism
JEL:D72
D74
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des WZB
Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
682496022.pdf664.84 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54590

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.