Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54585
Authors: 
Geys, Benny
Mause, Karsten
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2011-101
Abstract: 
Elected representatives in many countries are legally allowed to carry out (un)paid jobs in addition to their political mandate, often referred to as moonlighting. Despite the important selection and incentive effects such outside positions might engender, academic studies evaluating the prevalence, desirability and/or consequences of politicians' moonlighting have remained relatively scarce; often due to severe data restrictions. In recent years, however, more stringent disclosure rules have increased data availability, and large-sample analyses are becoming increasingly feasible. Besides surveying recent empirical contributions to this developing research field, this paper also outlines unresolved issues and thereby develops an agenda for future enquiry.
Subjects: 
Moonlighting
outside interests
outside income
shirking
disclosure rules
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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