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Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" >
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| Title: | | Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy |
| Authors: | | Konrad, Kai A. Thum, Marcel |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion papers // Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik: Forschungsprofessur & Projekt The Future of Fiscal Federalism SP II 2011-109 |
| Abstract: | | We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements. |
| Subjects: | | Mitigation international climate agreements bargaining unilateral advances |
| JEL: | | Q54 Q58 F53 H41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"
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| The document was removed on behalf of the author(s)/ the editor(s) on: April 18, 2012 |
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