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Title:Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy
Authors:Konrad, Kai A.
Thum, Marcel
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2011-109
Abstract:We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.
Subjects:Mitigation
international climate agreements
bargaining
unilateral advances
JEL:Q54
Q58
F53
H41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"

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