Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54450 
Year of Publication: 
2008
Citation: 
[Journal:] Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa (IEDEE) [ISSN:] 1135-2523 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2008 [Pages:] 51-72
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the balance of organizational components in the design of an efficient organizational architecture from an agency perspective. The results of the empirical analysis, performed in the most prominent Spanish NGDO throughout the year 2003, show the great importance of the mutual influence among the delegation of decision rights, the incentive systems and the use of performance measurements in the achievement of organizational equilibrium.
Subjects: 
organizational architecture
incentives
delegation
performance
NGDOs
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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