Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54225
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dc.contributor.authorEllert, Alexanderen_US
dc.contributor.authorUrmann, Oliveren_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-06T10:35:30Z-
dc.date.availablestart=2012-01-06T10:35:30Z; end=2013-05-31-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/54225-
dc.description.abstractUsing a vertical differentiation model, we investigate the product quality strategies of two competing firms maximizing market shares. The firms are facing variable costs of quality improvement and choose their prices under the constraint of nonnegative profits. We show that in equilibrium there is no differentiation in quality if the market coverage is either increasing or decreasing and concave in quality. Otherwise the existence of an equilibrium depends on the structure of the game. If the firms choose their qualities simultaneously there is no equilibrium, while there is an equilibrium with a first mover advantage and quality differentiation in the sequential quality competition.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Institut für Versicherungsbetriebslehre |cHamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers on Risk and Insurance |x25en_US
dc.subject.jelL10en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL21en_US
dc.subject.jelI11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMarket share maximiziationen_US
dc.subject.keywordVertical differentiationen_US
dc.subject.keywordHealth care marketen_US
dc.titleQuality differentiation if market share mattersen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn641729111en_US
dc.relation.isreplacedbyhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/74540-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:hzvwps:25-

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