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dc.contributor.authorEllert, Alexanderen_US
dc.contributor.authorUrmann, Oliveren_US; end=2013-05-31-
dc.description.abstractUsing a vertical differentiation model, we investigate the product quality strategies of two competing firms maximizing market shares. The firms are facing variable costs of quality improvement and choose their prices under the constraint of nonnegative profits. We show that in equilibrium there is no differentiation in quality if the market coverage is either increasing or decreasing and concave in quality. Otherwise the existence of an equilibrium depends on the structure of the game. If the firms choose their qualities simultaneously there is no equilibrium, while there is an equilibrium with a first mover advantage and quality differentiation in the sequential quality competition.en_US
dc.publisherUniv., Institut für Versicherungsbetriebslehre Hamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers on Risk and Insurance 25en_US
dc.subject.keywordMarket share maximiziationen_US
dc.subject.keywordVertical differentiationen_US
dc.subject.keywordHealth care marketen_US
dc.titleQuality differentiation if market share mattersen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers on Risk and Insurance, Institut für Versicherungsbetriebslehre, Universität Hamburg

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