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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WIDER Working Paper No. 2010/85
Verlag: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
Particular sets of institutions, once they become established in a society, have a strong tendency to persist. In this paper I argue that understanding how elites form and reproduce is key to understanding the persistence of institutions over time. I illustrate this idea with a simple political economy theory of institutions and through examples from Liberia, the US, South Africa and Germany I show how elites influence institutions. To change institutions requires having an understanding of how reforms influence the preferences, capabilities and strategies of elites.
Schlagwörter: 
elites
political economy
persistence of institutions
JEL: 
D02
D72
N40
O43
ISBN: 
978-92-9230-323-5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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