Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54177
Authors: 
Robinson, James A.
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working paper // World Institute for Development Economics Research 2010,85
Abstract: 
Particular sets of institutions, once they become established in a society, have a strong tendency to persist. In this paper I argue that understanding how elites form and reproduce is key to understanding the persistence of institutions over time. I illustrate this idea with a simple political economy theory of institutions and through examples from Liberia, the US, South Africa and Germany I show how elites influence institutions. To change institutions requires having an understanding of how reforms influence the preferences, capabilities and strategies of elites.
Subjects: 
elites
political economy
persistence of institutions
JEL: 
D02
D72
N40
O43
ISBN: 
978-92-9230-323-5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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