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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54177
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| Title: | | Elites and institutional persistence  |
| Authors: | | Robinson, James A. |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working paper // World Institute for Development Economics Research 2010,85 |
| Abstract: | | Particular sets of institutions, once they become established in a society, have a strong tendency to persist. In this paper I argue that understanding how elites form and reproduce is key to understanding the persistence of institutions over time. I illustrate this idea with a simple political economy theory of institutions and through examples from Liberia, the US, South Africa and Germany I show how elites influence institutions. To change institutions requires having an understanding of how reforms influence the preferences, capabilities and strategies of elites. |
| Subjects: | | elites political economy persistence of institutions |
| JEL: | | D02 D72 N40 O43 |
| ISBN: | | 978-92-9230-323-5 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | WIDER Working Papers, United Nations University (UNU)
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