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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54177
  
Title:Elites and institutional persistence PDF Logo
Authors:Robinson, James A.
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Working paper // World Institute for Development Economics Research 2010,85
Abstract:Particular sets of institutions, once they become established in a society, have a strong tendency to persist. In this paper I argue that understanding how elites form and reproduce is key to understanding the persistence of institutions over time. I illustrate this idea with a simple political economy theory of institutions and through examples from Liberia, the US, South Africa and Germany I show how elites influence institutions. To change institutions requires having an understanding of how reforms influence the preferences, capabilities and strategies of elites.
Subjects:elites
political economy
persistence of institutions
JEL:D02
D72
N40
O43
ISBN:978-92-9230-323-5
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:WIDER Working Papers, United Nations University (UNU)

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