EconStor >
United Nations University (UNU) >
World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations University >
WIDER Working Papers, United Nations University (UNU) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53985
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorde Janvry, Alainen_US
dc.contributor.authorGonzalez-Navarro, Marcoen_US
dc.contributor.authorSadoulet, Elisabethen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T13:15:27Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T13:15:27Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-92-9230-401-0en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53985-
dc.description.abstractThe Mexican land reform, one of the most sweeping in the world, proceeded in two steps: it granted peasants highly incomplete property rights on more than half of the Mexican territory starting in 1914, creating strong economic and political dependence for beneficiaries on the ruling political party; and complete property rights starting in 1992, allowing beneficiaries to relate directly to the market. We analyse the impact on political behaviour of switching from incomplete to complete property rights. We use for this the 13-year nationwide rollout of the certification programme and match land reform communities (ejidos) before and after titling with electoral outcomes in corresponding sections across seven electoral episodes. We find that, in accordance with the investor class theory, granting complete property rights induced a conservative shift toward the challenger pro-market party. This shift was strongest where vested interests created larger benefits from market-oriented policies as opposed to public transfer policies. We also find that beneficiaries of the one-time irreversible transfer of a land title failed to reciprocate through votes for the benefactor party, the long time ruling party. The outcome shows that it is difficult for an authoritarian populist party to engage in a land reform that grants complete property rights, suggesting why so many land reforms are either not implemented due to political risk or remain at the ineffective level of incomplete property rights.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherWIDER Helsinkien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper // World Institute for Development Economics Research 2011,36en_US
dc.subject.jelO13en_US
dc.subject.jelN66en_US
dc.subject.jelQ24en_US
dc.subject.jelP4en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordland reformen_US
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordMexicoen_US
dc.subject.stwBodenreformen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechten_US
dc.subject.stwParteipolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwMexikoen_US
dc.titleCan a populist political party bear the risk of granting complete property rights? Electoral outcomes of Mexico's second land reformen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn663784166en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:WIDER Working Papers, United Nations University (UNU)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
663784166.pdf505.33 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.