EconStor >
Bank of Canada, Ottawa >
Bank of Canada Working Papers >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53959
  
Title:Inflation and unemployment in competitive search equilibrium PDF Logo
Authors:Dong, Mei
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Bank of Canada Working Paper 2010,15
Abstract:Using a monetary search model, Rocheteau, Rupert and Wright (2007) show that the relationship between inflation and unemployment can be positive or negative depending on the primitives of the model. The key features are indivisible labor, nonseparable preferences and bargaining. Their results are derived only for a special case of the bargaining solution, take-it-or-leave-it offer by buyers. Instead of bargaining, this paper considers competitive search (price posting with directed search). I show that the results in Rocheteau, Rupert and Wright (2007) can be generalized in an environment where both buyers and sellers have nonseparable preferences. In addition, the relationship between inflation and unemployment is robust to allowing free entry by sellers, which cannot be studied in Rocheteau, Rupert and Wright (2007).
Subjects:Inflation: costs and benefits
JEL:E40
E52
E12
E13
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Bank of Canada Working Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
630742294.pdf217.09 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53959

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.