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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53907
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Cao, Shutao | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Shao, Enchuan | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Silos, Pedro | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-10-10 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-12-15T12:58:02Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-12-15T12:58:02Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53907 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper constructs a theory of the coexistence of fixed-term and permanent employment contracts in an environment with ex-ante identical workers and employers. Workers under fixed-term contracts can be dismissed at no cost while permanent employees enjoy labor protection. In a labor market characterized by search and matching frictions, firms find it optimal to discriminate by offering some workers a fixedterm contract while offering other workers a permanent contract. Match-specific quality between a worker and a firm determines the type of contract offered. We analytically characterize the firm's hiring and firing rules. Using matched employer-employee data from Canada, we estimate the model's parameters. Increasing the level of firing costs increases wage inequality and decreases the unemployment rate. The increase in inequality results from a larger fraction of temporary workers and not from an increase in the wage premium earned by permanent workers. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Bank of Canada Ottawa | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Bank of Canada Working Paper 2011,21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H29 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J38 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Labour markets | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Potential output | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Productivity | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Fixed-term and permanent employment contracts: Theory and evidence | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 669551023 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bank of Canada Working Papers
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