Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53612
Authors: 
Kawai, Masahiro
Petri, Peter A.
Sisli-Ciamarra, Elif
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
ADBI working paper series 157
Abstract: 
The global economic crisis refocused attention on the governance of international economic institutions (IEIs). This study uses the analytical framework of club theory to highlight structural obstacles to reform in international macroeconomic management, development finance, trade, and financial stability. The authors argue that reforms currently being discussed - for example, in voting power in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank - are important, but not sufficient to make IEIs adaptable to the demands of a rapidly changing world economy. The authors propose transforming IEIs by shifting more decisions from the global to sub-global level. Partially decentralized decision making already exists in some policy areas (for example in regional development banks) and could expand and improve the provision of international public goods.
JEL: 
F02
F13
F33
F42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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