Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53425 
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dc.contributor.authorIlkiliç, Rahmien
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:34:55Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:34:55Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53425-
dc.description.abstractSuppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x32.2009en
dc.subject.jelC62en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD85en
dc.subject.jelL11en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCournot Marketsen
dc.subject.keywordNetworksen
dc.subject.keywordNash Equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordCentrality Measuresen
dc.titleCournot competition on a network of markets and firms-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn645053813en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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