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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53425
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| Title: | | Cournot competition on a network of markets and firms  |
| Authors: | | IlkiliƧ, Rahmi |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 32.2009 |
| Abstract: | | Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. |
| Subjects: | | Cournot Markets Networks Nash Equilibrium Centrality Measures |
| JEL: | | C62 C72 D85 L11 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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