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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53424
  
Title:Civil liability, safety and nuclear parks: Is concentrated management better? PDF Logo
Authors:Mondello, Gérard
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 34.2011
Abstract:Ultra-hazardous risky activities as the nuclear industry cannot be considered as normal industries i.e. without abnormal environmental and health risks. This theoretical paper studies the industrial organization of electro nuclear sectors from the view point of the general cost of impact prevention policy and civil liability. It assesses on a theoretical basis, how civil liability rules may induce or discourage the extension of nuclear parks to new emergent operators. It compares the consequences of extending to several independent owners the management of nuclear stations. This question can apply to the unification process of the European electricity market in which several public and private nuclear power operators are running. The paper shows that the choice between either a monopolistic scheme (one operator for several plants) or a decentralized one (one operator by station) depends on the condition of application of the legal civil liability regime and on the strength of the safety control exerted by the Nuclear Regulatory Authorities. It is shown that when the control is high, then the safety costs generated by the monopolistic organization are less than the same costs of a decentralized one. However, conditions on the insurance policy can mitigate this result.
Subjects:Strict Liability
Electric Energy
Nuclear Plants
JEL:Q5
Q58
Q53
K23
L13
L52
L94
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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