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dc.contributor.authorPage, Frank H.en_US
dc.contributor.authorWooders, Myrna H.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:34:50Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:34:50Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53419-
dc.description.abstractIn all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the with whom) and the strategy (the how) of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as a directed network and to address the following open question in the theory of social and economic network formation: given the rules of network and coalition formation, the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in forming networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics are likely to emerge and persist. Our main contributions are (i) to formulate the problem of network and coalition formation as a dynamic, stochastic game, (ii) to show that this game possesses a stationary correlated equilibrium (in network and coalition formation strategies), (iii) to show that, together with the trembles of nature, this stationary correlated equilibrium determines an equilibrium Markov process of network and coalition formation, and (iv) to show that this endogenous process possesses a finite, nonempty set of ergodic measures, and generates a finite, disjoint collection of nonempty subsets of networks and coalitions, each constituting a basin of attraction. We also extend to the setting of endogenous Markov dynamics the notions of pairwise stability (Jackson-Wolinsky, 1996), strong stability (Jacksonvan den Nouweland, 2005), and Nash stability (Bala-Goyal, 2000), and we show that in order for any network-coalition pair to persist and be stable (pairwise, strong, or Nash) it is necessary and sufficient that the pair reside in one of finitely many basins of attraction. The results we obtain here for endogenous network dynamics and stochastic basins of attraction are the dynamic analogs of our earlier results on endogenous network formation and strategic basins of attraction in static, abstract games of network formation (Page and Wooders, 2008), and build on the seminal contributions of Jackson and Watts (2002), Konishi and Ray (2003), and Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 28.2009en_US
dc.subject.jelA14en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous Network Dynamicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordDynamic Stochastic Games of Network Formationen_US
dc.subject.keywordEquilibrium Markov Process of Network Formationen_US
dc.subject.keywordBasins of Attractionen_US
dc.subject.keywordHarris Decompositionen_US
dc.subject.keywordErgodic Probability Measuresen_US
dc.subject.keywordDynamic Path Dominance Coreen_US
dc.subject.keywordDynamic Pairwise Stabilityen_US
dc.titleEndogenous network dynamicsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn645050156en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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