Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53405
Authors: 
Valsecchi, Irene
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 19.2009
Abstract: 
The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size. Second, provided a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists, different message rules and beliefs can hold in other equilibria inducing the same action profile.
Subjects: 
Sender-Receiver Games
Strategic Information Transmission
JEL: 
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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