Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53400 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 51.2009
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted.
Subjects: 
Indivisible Goods Market
Dynamics
Competitive Allocation
Strict Core
Foresight
Stable Set
JEL: 
D78
C71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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