EconStor >
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Mailand >
FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei  >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53400
  
Title:Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market PDF Logo
Authors:Kamijo, Yoshio
Kawasaki, Ryo
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 51.2009
Abstract:While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted.
Subjects:Indivisible Goods Market
Dynamics
Competitive Allocation
Strict Core
Foresight
Stable Set
JEL:D78
C71
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
645176265.pdf210.27 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53400

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.