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dc.contributor.authorAthanassoglou, Stergiosen_US
dc.contributor.authorSheriff, Glennen_US
dc.contributor.authorSiegfried, Tobiasen_US
dc.contributor.authorHuh, Woonghee Timen_US
dc.description.abstractStandard economic models of groundwater management impose restrictive assumptions regarding perfect transmissivity (i.e., the aquifer behaves as a bathtub), no external effects of groundwater stocks, observability of individual extraction rates, and/or homogenous agents. In this article, we derive regulatory mechanisms for inducing the socially optimal extraction path in Markov perfect equilibrium for aquifers in which these assumptions do not hold. In spite of the complexity of the underlying system, we identify an interesting case in which a simple linear mechanism achieves the social optimum. To illustrate potential problems that can arise by erroneously imposing simplifying assumptions, we conduct a simulation based on data from the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh.en_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 28.2011en_US
dc.subject.keywordCommon Property Resourceen_US
dc.subject.keywordDifferential Gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordGroundwater Extractionen_US
dc.subject.keywordImperfect Monitoringen_US
dc.subject.keywordMarkov Perfect Equilibriumen_US
dc.titleOptimal mechanisms for heterogeneous multi-cell aquifersen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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