Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53397 
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dc.contributor.authorAthanassoglou, Stergiosen
dc.contributor.authorSheriff, Glennen
dc.contributor.authorSiegfried, Tobiasen
dc.contributor.authorHuh, Woonghee Timen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:34:28Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:34:28Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53397-
dc.description.abstractStandard economic models of groundwater management impose restrictive assumptions regarding perfect transmissivity (i.e., the aquifer behaves as a bathtub), no external effects of groundwater stocks, observability of individual extraction rates, and/or homogenous agents. In this article, we derive regulatory mechanisms for inducing the socially optimal extraction path in Markov perfect equilibrium for aquifers in which these assumptions do not hold. In spite of the complexity of the underlying system, we identify an interesting case in which a simple linear mechanism achieves the social optimum. To illustrate potential problems that can arise by erroneously imposing simplifying assumptions, we conduct a simulation based on data from the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x28.2011en
dc.subject.jelC6en
dc.subject.jelD0en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCommon Property Resourceen
dc.subject.keywordDifferential Gamesen
dc.subject.keywordGroundwater Extractionen
dc.subject.keywordImperfect Monitoringen
dc.subject.keywordMarkov Perfect Equilibriumen
dc.titleOptimal mechanisms for heterogeneous multi-cell aquifers-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn655956573en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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