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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53376
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| Title: | | Inheritance law and investment in family firms  |
| Authors: | | Panunzi, Fausto Ellul, Andrew Pagano, Marco |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets 06.2009 |
| Abstract: | | Entrepreneurs may be constrained by the law to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,245 firms from 32 countries over the 1990-2006 interval, we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms, while it leaves investment unaffected in non-family firms. Moreover, as predicted by the model, inheritance law affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession. |
| Subjects: | | Succession Family Firms Inheritance Law Growth Investment |
| JEL: | | G32 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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