EconStor >
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Mailand >
FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei  >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53376
  
Title:Inheritance law and investment in family firms PDF Logo
Authors:Panunzi, Fausto
Ellul, Andrew
Pagano, Marco
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets 06.2009
Abstract:Entrepreneurs may be constrained by the law to bequeath a minimal stake to non-controlling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,245 firms from 32 countries over the 1990-2006 interval, we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms, while it leaves investment unaffected in non-family firms. Moreover, as predicted by the model, inheritance law affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession.
Subjects:Succession
Family Firms
Inheritance Law
Growth
Investment
JEL:G32
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
644835087.pdf1.4 MBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53376

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.