EconStor >
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Mailand >
FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei  >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53374
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAthanassoglou, Stergiosen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:34:08Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:34:08Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53374-
dc.description.abstractConsider a collection of m indivisible objects to be allocated to n agents, where m Ï n. Each agent falls in one of two distinct categories: either he (a) has a complete ordinal ranking over the set of individual objects, or (b) has a set of plausible benchmark von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions in whose non-negative span his true utility is known to lie. An allocation is undominated if there does not exist a preference-compatible profile of vNM utilities at which it is Pareto dominated by another feasible allocation. Given an undominated allocation, we use the tools of linear duality theory to construct a profile of vNM utilities at which it is ex-ante welfare maximizing. A finite set of preference-compatible vNM utility profiles is exhibited such that every undominated allocation is ex-ante welfare maximizing with respect to at least one of them. Given an arbitrary allocation, we provide an interpretation of the constructed vNM utilities as subgradients of a function which measures worst-case domination.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 11.2011en_US
dc.subject.jelC61en_US
dc.subject.jelD01en_US
dc.subject.jelD60en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRandom Assignmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordEfficiencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordDualityen_US
dc.subject.keywordLinear Programmingen_US
dc.titleEfficient random assignment under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferencesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn647193140en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
647193140.pdf276.03 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.