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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53374
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Athanassoglou, Stergios | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-12-15T11:34:08Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-12-15T11:34:08Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53374 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Consider a collection of m indivisible objects to be allocated to n agents, where m Ï n. Each agent falls in one of two distinct categories: either he (a) has a complete ordinal ranking over the set of individual objects, or (b) has a set of plausible benchmark von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility functions in whose non-negative span his true utility is known to lie. An allocation is undominated if there does not exist a preference-compatible profile of vNM utilities at which it is Pareto dominated by another feasible allocation. Given an undominated allocation, we use the tools of linear duality theory to construct a profile of vNM utilities at which it is ex-ante welfare maximizing. A finite set of preference-compatible vNM utility profiles is exhibited such that every undominated allocation is ex-ante welfare maximizing with respect to at least one of them. Given an arbitrary allocation, we provide an interpretation of the constructed vNM utilities as subgradients of a function which measures worst-case domination. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milano | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 11.2011 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C61 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D01 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D60 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Random Assignment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Efficiency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Duality | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Linear Programming | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Efficient random assignment under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 647193140 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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