EconStor >
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Mailand >
FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53374

 
Title:   Efficient random assignment under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences 
Authors:   Athanassoglou, Stergios 
Issue Date:   2011 
Series/Report no.:   Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 11.2011 
Abstract:   Consider a collection of m indivisible objects to be allocated to n agents, where m Ï n. Each agent falls in one of two distinct categories: either he (a) has a complete ordinal ranking over the set of individual objects, or (b) has a set of plausible benchmark von NeumannMorgenstern (vNM) utility functions in whose nonnegative span his true utility is known to lie. An allocation is undominated if there does not exist a preferencecompatible profile of vNM utilities at which it is Pareto dominated by another feasible allocation. Given an undominated allocation, we use the tools of linear duality theory to construct a profile of vNM utilities at which it is exante welfare maximizing. A finite set of preferencecompatible vNM utility profiles is exhibited such that every undominated allocation is exante welfare maximizing with respect to at least one of them. Given an arbitrary allocation, we provide an interpretation of the constructed vNM utilities as subgradients of a function which measures worstcase domination. 
Subjects:   Random Assignment Efficiency Duality Linear Programming 
JEL:   C61 D01 D60 
Document Type:   Working Paper 
Appears in Collections:   FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

 

 
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX

 
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53374

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
