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dc.contributor.authorHong, Sunghoonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:34:03Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:34:03Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53369-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target cause a target loss while the blocked arcs cause a network loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from both target loss and network loss. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. In this model we study Nash equilibria and find a power law relation between the probability and the extent of the target loss. Our model contributes to the literature of game theory by introducing non-cooperative behavior into a Kalai-Zemel (cooperative) game of flow. Our research also advances models and results on network interdiction.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development Series 43.2011en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD85en_US
dc.subject.jelH56en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordNetwork Interdictionen_US
dc.subject.keywordNoncooperative Game of Flowen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordPower Lawen_US
dc.subject.keywordKalai-Zemel Game of Flowen_US
dc.titleStrategic network interdictionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn661239136en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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