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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53369
  
Title:Strategic network interdiction PDF Logo
Authors:Hong, Sunghoon
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development Series 43.2011
Abstract:We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target cause a target loss while the blocked arcs cause a network loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from both target loss and network loss. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. In this model we study Nash equilibria and find a power law relation between the probability and the extent of the target loss. Our model contributes to the literature of game theory by introducing non-cooperative behavior into a Kalai-Zemel (cooperative) game of flow. Our research also advances models and results on network interdiction.
Subjects:Network Interdiction
Noncooperative Game of Flow
Nash Equilibrium
Power Law
Kalai-Zemel Game of Flow
JEL:C72
D85
H56
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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