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dc.contributor.authorGuerriero, Carmineen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:33:50Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:33:50Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53355-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the political economy of regulatory and judicial appointment rules. I study a model of price-setting by a political principal faced with a firm with unknown costs, and endowed with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency rises with the effort exerted by two accountable supervisors (a regulator and a judge). This set-up captures the institutions of several international markets. The model predicts that reforms toward election rather than appointment of regulators are more likely the less efficient is the information-gathering technology, the less stringent are the investment concerns of society, the stronger are regulators' revolving-door motivations, and the closer is political competition. These predictions are consistent with US electric power market data. Moreover, in accordance with the model, electricity rates are lower and respond less to shock in input costs in states that elect their regulators or their High Court judges.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets 55.2008en_US
dc.subject.jelK23en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelQ43en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordElectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordAgencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordJudgesen_US
dc.subject.keywordRegulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordElectricityen_US
dc.titleAccountability in government and regulatory policies: Theory and evidenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn642704309en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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