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dc.contributor.authorAkerman, Andersen_US
dc.contributor.authorLarsson, Annaen_US
dc.contributor.authorNaghavi, Alirezaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:33:44Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:33:44Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53350-
dc.description.abstractData on the growth performances of countries with similar comparative (dis)advantage and political institutions reveal a striking variation across world regions. While some former autocracies such as the East Asian growth miracles have done remarkably well, others such as the Latin American economies have grown at much lower rates. In this paper, we propose a political economy explanation of these diverging paths of development by addressing the preferences of the country's political elite. We build a theoretical framework where factors of production owned by the political elites differ across countries. In each country, the incumbent autocrat will cater to the preferences of the elites when setting trade policy and the property rights regime. We show how stronger property rights may lead to capital accumulation and labor reallocation to the manufacturing sector. This, in turn, can lead to a shift in the comparative advantage, a decision to open up to trade and an inflow of more productive foreign capital. Consistent with a set of stylised facts on East Asia and Latin America, we argue that strong property rights are crucial for success upon globalization.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Economy and Society 65.2011en_US
dc.subject.jelF10en_US
dc.subject.jelF20en_US
dc.subject.jelP14en_US
dc.subject.jelP16en_US
dc.subject.jelO10en_US
dc.subject.jelO24en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAutocracyen_US
dc.subject.keywordGrowthen_US
dc.subject.keywordPolitical Elitesen_US
dc.subject.keywordLandownersen_US
dc.subject.keywordCapitalistsen_US
dc.subject.keywordGrowth Miraclesen_US
dc.subject.keywordTradeen_US
dc.subject.keywordComparative Advantageen_US
dc.subject.keywordCapital Mobilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordProperty Rightsen_US
dc.subject.stwKomparativer Kostenvorteilen_US
dc.subject.stwInstitutionelle Infrastrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentumsrechten_US
dc.subject.stwKapitalmobilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwEliteen_US
dc.subject.stwAutoritäres Systemen_US
dc.subject.stwLateinamerikaen_US
dc.subject.stwOstasienen_US
dc.titleAutocracies and development in a global economy: A tale of two elitesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn668385804en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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