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dc.contributor.authorPartnoy, Franken_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:33:15Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:33:15Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53327-
dc.description.abstractThe first part of the paper describes how over time credit rating agencies ceased to play the role of information intermediaries. Rating agencies did not provide information about the risk associated with the securitized instruments, but they simply enabled structurers to create and maintain tranches of these instruments with unjustifiably high credit ratings. The second part of the paper suggests how future policy may minimize overdependence on credit ratings, by removing regulatory licences and by implementing shock-therapy mechanisms to wean investors simple rating mnemonics.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets 27.2009en_US
dc.subject.jelG24en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordRating Agenciesen_US
dc.subject.keywordSubprime Mortgagesen_US
dc.subject.keywordSecuritizationen_US
dc.titleOverdependence on credit ratings was a primary cause of the crisisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn645049697en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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