Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53327 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 27.2009
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
The first part of the paper describes how over time credit rating agencies ceased to play the role of information intermediaries. Rating agencies did not provide information about the risk associated with the securitized instruments, but they simply enabled structurers to create and maintain tranches of these instruments with unjustifiably high credit ratings. The second part of the paper suggests how future policy may minimize overdependence on credit ratings, by removing regulatory licences and by implementing shock-therapy mechanisms to wean investors simple rating mnemonics.
Schlagwörter: 
Rating Agencies
Subprime Mortgages
Securitization
JEL: 
G24
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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