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Title:Optimal equilibria of the best shot game PDF Logo
Authors:Pin, Paolo
Dall'Asta, Luca
Ramezanpour, Abolfazl
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 33.2009
Abstract:We consider any network environment in which the best shot game is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A natural application of the model is one in which the action 1 is the purchase of a good, which is locally a public good, in the sense that it will be available also to neighbors. This game will typically exhibit a great multiplicity of equilibria. Imagine a social planner whose scope is to find an optimal equilibrium, i.e. one in which the number of nodes playing 1 is minimal. To find such an equilibrium is a very hard task for any non-trivial network architecture. We propose an implementable mechanism that, in the limit of infinite time, reaches an optimal equilibrium, even if this equilibrium and even the network structure is unknown to the social planner.
Subjects:Networks
Best Shot Game
Simulated Annealing
JEL:C61
C63
D85
H41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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