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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53302
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| Title: | | Networks with group counterproposals  |
| Authors: | | Nieva, Ricardo |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 61.2008 |
| Abstract: | | We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency. |
| Subjects: | | Efficiency Bargaining Protocol Counterproposals Network Formation Transfers Externalities Groups Coalitions |
| JEL: | | C71 C72 C73 C78 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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