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Title:Networks with group counterproposals PDF Logo
Authors:Nieva, Ricardo
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 61.2008
Abstract:We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency.
Subjects:Efficiency
Bargaining Protocol
Counterproposals
Network Formation
Transfers
Externalities
Groups
Coalitions
JEL:C71
C72
C73
C78
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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