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dc.contributor.authorQuirion, Philippeen_US
dc.contributor.authorDemailly, Damienen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:32:41Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:32:41Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53298-
dc.description.abstractWe assess five proposals for the future of the EU greenhouse gas Emission Trading Scheme (ETS): pure grandfathering allocation of emission allowances (GF), output-based allocation (OB), auctioning (AU), auctioning with border adjustments (AU-BA), and finally output-based allocation in sectors exposed to international competition combined with auctioning in electricity generation (OB-AU). We look at the impact on production, trade, CO2 leakage and welfare. We use a partial equilibrium model of the EU 27 featuring three sectors covered by the EU ETS - cement, steel and electricity - plus the aluminium sector, which is indirectly impacted through a rise in electricity price. The leakage ratio, i.e. the increase in emissions abroad over the decrease in EU emissions, ranges from around 8% under GF and AU to -2% under AU-BA and varies greatly among sectors. Concerning the overall economic cost, OB appears to be the least efficient policy, even when taking into account its ability to prevent CO2 leakage. On the other hand, this policy minimises production losses and wealth transfers among stakeholders, which is likely to soften oppositions. GF and AU are the most efficient policies from an EU perspective, even when leakage is accounted for. From a world welfare perspective and whatever the emission reduction, AU-BA is the least costly policy, while OB-AU, AU and GF entail similar costs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 89.2008en_US
dc.subject.jelQ5en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEmission Tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordAllowance Allocationen_US
dc.subject.keywordLeakageen_US
dc.subject.keywordSpilloveren_US
dc.subject.keywordClimate Policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordKyoto Protocolen_US
dc.subject.keywordBorder Adjustmenten_US
dc.titleChanging the allocation rules in the EU ETS: Impact on competitiveness and economic efficiencyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn644369132en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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