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dc.contributor.authorPolanski, Arnolden_US
dc.contributor.authorLazarova, Emiliya A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:32:35Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:32:35Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53293-
dc.description.abstractWe study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players' payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. In this setting, we establish payoff uniqueness of the stationary equilibria when players exhibit some degree of impatience. We focus on market games with different player types, and derive under mild conditions an explicit formula for each type's equilibrium payoff as market frictions vanish. The limit payoff of a type depends in an intuitive way on the supply and the demand for this type in the market, adjusted by the type-specific bargaining power. Our framework may be viewed as an alternative to the Walrasian price-setting mechanism. When we apply this methodology to the analysis of labor markets, we can determine endogenously the equilibrium firm size and remuneration scheme. We find that each worker type in a stationary market equilibrium is rewarded her marginal product, i.e. we obtain a strategic underpinning of the neoclassical wage. Interestingly, we can also replicate some standardized facts from the search-theoretical literature such as positive equilibrium unemployment.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development Series 44.2011en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelJ30en_US
dc.subject.jelL20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMultilateral Bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordDynamic Marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordLabor Marketsen_US
dc.titleDynamic multilateral marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn661241963en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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