Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53291
Authors: 
Finus, Michael
Rundshagen, Bianca
Eyckmans, Johan
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 109.2009
Abstract: 
We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.
Subjects: 
International Climate Agreements
Sequential Coalition Formation
Coordination through Moderator
Integrated Assessment Model
Algorithm for Computations
JEL: 
C79
H87
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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