Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53272
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dc.contributor.authorDimitrov, Dinkoen_US
dc.contributor.authorSung, Shao Chinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:32:16Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:32:16Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53272-
dc.description.abstractWe show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development Series |x52.2011en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCoreen_US
dc.subject.keywordHedonic Gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordMonotonicityen_US
dc.subject.keywordStable Setsen_US
dc.titleSize monotonicity and stability of the core in hedonic gamesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn664548083en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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