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Title:Size monotonicity and stability of the core in hedonic games PDF Logo
Authors:Dimitrov, Dinko
Sung, Shao Chin
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development Series 52.2011
Abstract:We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games.
Hedonic Games
Stable Sets
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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