Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53269
Authors: 
Germain, Marc
Tulkens, Henry
Magnus, Alphonse
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 26.2009
Abstract: 
This article deals with cooperation issues in international pollution problems in a two di- mensional dynamic framework implied by the accumulation of the pollutant and of the capital goods. Assuming that countries do reevaluate at each period the advantages to cooperate or not given the current stocks of pollutant and capital, and under the assumption that damage cost functions are linear, we define at each period of time a transfer scheme between countries, which makes cooperation better for each of them than non-cooperation. This transfer scheme is also strategically stable in the sense that it discourages partial coalitions.
Subjects: 
Stock Pollutant
Capital Accumulation
International Environmental Agreements
Dynamic Core Solution
JEL: 
Q54
Q58
F42
F53
O21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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