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dc.contributor.authorBoutin, Xavieren_US
dc.contributor.authorCestone, Giacintaen_US
dc.contributor.authorFumagalli, Chiaraen_US
dc.contributor.authorPica, Giovannien_US
dc.contributor.authorSerrano-Velarde, Nicolasen_US
dc.description.abstractWe provide evidence suggesting that incumbents' access to group deep pockets has a negative impact on entry in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set on business groups, our paper presents three major findings. First, the amount of cash holdings owned by incumbent-affiliated groups is negatively related to entry in a market. Second, the impact on entry of group deep pockets is more important in markets where access to external funding is likely to be more difficult. Third, the entry deterring effect of group deep pockets is more pronounced when groups have more active internal capital markets. Our findings suggest that internal capital markets operate within corporate groups and that they have a potential anti-competitive effect.en_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets 108.2009en_US
dc.subject.keywordBusiness Groupsen_US
dc.subject.keywordCash Holdingsen_US
dc.subject.keywordInternal Capital Marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordMarket Entryen_US
dc.titleThe deep-pocket effect of internal capital marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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