Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53260 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 29.2009
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically affected, as more individuals manipulate their preferentes. Including a safety school in the constrained list explains most manipulations. Competitiveness across schools plays an important role. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the constraint reduces significantly the proportion of subjects playing a dominated strategy.
Subjects: 
School Choice
Matching
Experiment
Gale-Shapley
Top Trading Cycles
Boston Mechanism
Efficiency
Stability
Truncation
Truthtelling
Safety School
JEL: 
C72
C78
D78
I20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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