Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53245
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dc.contributor.authorDi Corato, Lucaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-01en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:31:51Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:31:51Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53245-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study the optimal forest conservation policy by a hyperbolically discounting society. Society comprises a series of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations each represented by its own government. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution of an intergenerational dynamic game, the optimal timing of irreversible harvest. Earlier harvest occurs and the option value attached to the forest clearing decision is eroded under both the assumptions of näive and sophisticated belief about future time-preferences. This results in a bias toward the current generation gratification which affects the intergenerational allocation of benefits and costs from harvesting and conserving a natural forest.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development |x89.2011en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.jelQ23en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordImperfect Altruismen_US
dc.subject.keywordReal Optionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordHyperbolic Discountingen_US
dc.subject.keywordTime Inconsistencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordNatural Resources Managementen_US
dc.titleOptimal conservation policy under imperfect intergenerational altruismen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn675907691en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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