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FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53245
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Di Corato, Luca | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-12-01 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-12-15T11:31:51Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-12-15T11:31:51Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53245 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this paper we study the optimal forest conservation policy by a hyperbolically discounting society. Society comprises a series of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations each represented by its own government. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution of an intergenerational dynamic game, the optimal timing of irreversible harvest. Earlier harvest occurs and the option value attached to the forest clearing decision is eroded under both the assumptions of näive and sophisticated belief about future time-preferences. This results in a bias toward the current generation gratification which affects the intergenerational allocation of benefits and costs from harvesting and conserving a natural forest. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milano | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Climate Change and Sustainable Development 89.2011 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D81 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C70 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q58 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Imperfect Altruism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Real Options | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Hyperbolic Discounting | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Time Inconsistency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Natural Resources Management | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Optimal conservation policy under imperfect intergenerational altruism | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 675907691 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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