Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53221 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAnsink, Eriken
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:31:28Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:31:28Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53221-
dc.description.abstractMany water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyse whether water allocation agreements can be self-enforcing. An agreement is modelled as the outcome of bargaining game on river water allocation. Given this agreement, the bargaining game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which countries decide whether or not to comply with the agreement. I assess under what conditions such agreements are self-enforcing, given stochastic river flow. The results show that, for sufficiently low discounting, every efficient agreement can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium. Requiring renegotiation-proofness may shrink the set of possible agreements to a unique self-enforcing agreement. The solution induced by this particular agreement implements the downstream incremental distribution, an axiomatic solution to water allocation that assigns all gains from cooperation to downstream countries.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x73.2009en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelQ25en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSelf-Enforcing Agreementen
dc.subject.keywordRepeated Extensive-Form Gameen
dc.subject.keywordWater Allocationen
dc.subject.keywordRenegotiation-Proofnessen
dc.titleSelf-enforcing agreements on water allocation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn646014242en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
306.29 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.