Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53203 
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dc.contributor.authorMoretto, Micheleen
dc.contributor.authorDosi, Cesareen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:31:12Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:31:12Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53203-
dc.description.abstractWe study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - lowest price to consumers vs highest concession fee, and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate the contract. In turn, the relative advantages of each award criterion are affected by the concessioning conditions.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x23.2009en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.jelD44en
dc.subject.jelD92en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordConcessionsen
dc.subject.keywordAuctionsen
dc.subject.keywordAward criteriaen
dc.subject.keywordService Rollout Time limitsen
dc.titleAuctioning monopoly franchises: Award criteria and service launch requirements-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn644984554en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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