|
EconStor >
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Mailand >
FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53190
|
| | |
| Title: | | Connections among farsighted agents  |
| Authors: | | Vannetelbosch, Vincent Grandjean, Gilles Mauleon, Ana |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 30.2009 |
| Abstract: | | We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch's (Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We first investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks. We then provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly efficient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex. |
| Subjects: | | Farsighted Players Stability Efficiency Connections Model Buyerseller Networks |
| JEL: | | A14 C70 D20 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53190
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|