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dc.contributor.authorAlbano, Gian Luigien_US
dc.contributor.authorDini, Federicoen_US
dc.contributor.authorZampino, Robertoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:30:26Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:30:26Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53170-
dc.description.abstractCompetitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In exploring the determinants of suppliers' bidding behavior in procurement auctions for complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly, high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by suppliers' experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level of expected competition. These results might suggest that (scoring) auctions fail to appropriately incorporate buyers' complex price/quality preferences in the tender design.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets 86.2008en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.jelH51en_US
dc.subject.jelH57en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordProcurement Auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordScoring Rulesen_US
dc.subject.keywordIT Contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordPrice/Quality Ratioen_US
dc.titleBidding for complex projects: Evidence from the acquisitions of IT servicesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn644270918en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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