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FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53168
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Fumagalli, Chiara | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Motta, Massimo | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Rønde, Thomas | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-12-15T11:30:22Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-12-15T11:30:22Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53168 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Milano | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets 120.2009 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L12 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L40 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L42 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Monopolization Practices | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Vertical Agreements | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Exclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 646496905 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
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