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dc.contributor.authorFumagalli, Chiaraen_US
dc.contributor.authorMotta, Massimoen_US
dc.contributor.authorRønde, Thomasen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.en_US
dc.publisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Milanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets 120.2009en_US
dc.subject.keywordMonopolization Practicesen_US
dc.subject.keywordVertical Agreementsen_US
dc.titleExclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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