Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53168
Authors: 
Fumagalli, Chiara
Motta, Massimo
Rønde, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Institutions and markets 120.2009
Abstract: 
This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.
Subjects: 
Monopolization Practices
Vertical Agreements
JEL: 
L12
L40
L42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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